RECENT DIVORCE LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
AS TESTED BY FEDERAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION.
It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania Legislature,
which in 19o5, at the instance of Senator William C. Sproul,
passed an act creating the Pennsylvania Commission on Divorce,
and authorized the calling together of delegates from every other
state to meet at Washington for the purpose of framing a
Uniform Divorce Law, has since then refused three times to
adopt the Uniform Divorce Law framed by the National
Divorce Congress; approved by the Pennsylvania Divorce Commission; by the Pennsylvania State Bar Association; by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
and by the American Bar Association, and adopted by three
States, Delaware, New Jersey and Wisconsin.
The preamble to the act creating the Pennsylvania Divorce
Commission attributed the constantly increasing number of
divorces in the United States, to the lack of uniformity in the
divorce laws in every part of the country, and the main efforts
of each of the bodies above named, were especially directed
towards the substantive, jurisdictional questions involved, in
order that the anomalous situation existing in countless instances
of a couple being married in one state and not married in
another, might once for all be ended.
Not only has the Pennsylvania Legislature steadfastly refused to adopt this Uniform Divorce Law, but it has also,
through recent legislation, opened the doors to "easy divorce,"
as wide as any other state, ignoring, whether intentionally or
otherwise, the later decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, which clearly define the conditions essential to a court's
entertaining jurisdiction in divorce, if the decree to be rendered
is to have any extra-territorial validity whatever, by virtue of the
"full faith and credit clause" of the Constitution of the United
States; and ignoring further the proper principles underlying
the question of interstate comity.
(338)
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This recent legislation finds expression in the following
Acts of Assembly:
No. j, Act approved June 8, x91i,1 entitled:
"An act enabling the libellant in all proceedings for divorce on
the ground of desertion, to testify to the fact of desertion, and to
the efforts made by hin or her to induce the respondent to return
and resume the marital relation."
No. 2, Act approved May 9, 1913,2 entitled "An act relat-

ing to divorce." This act will be quoted at length hereafter.
No. 3, Act approved April 21, I915, 3 entitled:
"An act to amend the first section of an act, entitled 'An act
enabling the libellant in all proceedings for divorce on the ground
of desertion, to testify to the fact of desertion, and to the efforts
made by him or her to induce the respondent to return and resume
the marital relation,' approved June eighth, A. D. 1911, by making
the libellant a competent witness generally."
All of the above mentioned acts are both jurisdictional (or
substantive), and evidential (or adjective, i. e. procedural), in
character. And they all attempt to change the law of this Commonwealth as it existed, and had been construed prior to their
passage.
They are enlarging, both expressly and by implication, and
may, therefore, be interpreted as remedial in purpose.
In discussing all remedial legislation, it is advisable to hark
back to Lord Coke's rule, and consider, (i) What was the law
before the act was passed? (2) What was the mischief or
defect for which the law had not provided? (3) What remedy
has the legislature appointed? (4) What is the reason of the
remedy? To these, for the purpose of this article, may well be
added: (5) The practical and legal effect of the foregoing
4
remedial legislation.
'P. L 720.
sP. L xx.
-'P.L 154.

' Very

succinctly paraphrased b)y our own Supreme Court in Cumberland

County v. Boyd, 113 Pa. 52, 57: "Keeping in mind the previous law, the supposed evil and the remedy desired, we must consider the language of the
statute, and the fair and reasonable import thereof."
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I. THE EXiSTING LAW.
A. As to Jurisdiction of the Subject Afattcr; of the Person of
the Libellant; and of the Pcrson of the Respondent.
For ascertainment of the powers conferred upon the courts
of Pennsylvania to entertain jurisdiction in divorce proceedings,
the legal profession, owes a lasting indebtedness to the admirable
and exhaustive analysis of our various Acts of Assembly from
1815 to 19o3, made by His Honor Mayer Sulzberger, in the
case of Lyon v. Lyon, 5 which (subject to one or two minor additions and corrections) may well be termed a classic. Plagiarism therefrom, may accordingly be pardoned. Summarization
also is necessary. His'conclusions may be.postulated as follows:

(i)

Analysis of Pennsylvania Legislation.
The Act of March 13, 1815,6 Section 1i, 7 provides:

"That no person shall be entitled to a divorce from the bonds
of matrimony, by virtue of this act, who is not a citizen of this
State, and who. shall not have resided therein, at least one whole
year previous to the filing his or her petition or libel."

This act requires both "citizenship" and "residence."
Section 3 of this act provides that if the respondent cannot,

after the issuing of an alias subpoena, be found in "the proper
county where the injured party resides," then notice by publication -nay be given.
In Dorsey v. Dorsey," Chief Justice Gibson ruled that jurisdiction in divorce belongs to the court of the place of domicile;
that the wife's domicile is that of her husband, which her coverture prevents her from changing; that though the locus delicti
may not bc at the place of domicile, yet the injury is suffered
there, and therefore the law of the domicile, i. e., the matrimonial
domicile, at the time and place of the injury, is the rule for
everything but the original obligation of marriage.
' 13 District Reports 623.
*6 Sm. Laws 286.
' Which re-enacted Section 9 of the Act of September 19, 1785, 2 Sm.
Laws, p. 343.
' 7 Watts, p. 349.
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The reasoning of Chief Justice Gibson in this case seems
to be tinged somewhat with the English doctrine that the law of
the place of the marriage controls its dissolution as well, for he
declines to adopt what has been termed the American Rule, as
enunciated in Harding v. Alden,9 and Ditson v. Ditson,10 that
an injured wife may acquire a domicile, or residence in another
state and obtain a divorce from her husband in conformity with
the procedure prescribed by the laws of her new domicile. The
Chief Justice, in his opinion, discusses this question, but holds
finally that although the parties in the case were married in
Pennsylvania, yet, having afterwards become domiciled in Ohio,
where her husband deserted her, the offence was committed
there, and that although she returned to her original home and
place of marriage in Pennsylvania, she was not entitled to a
divorce, the proper forum being in Ohio, their common domicile,
at the time the offence occurred.
(2) By the Actof April i8, 1843,11 the eleventh section
of the Act of 1815 was amended, by the following language
" . . and the Word 'citizen' used in the eleventh Section of
the Act concerning divorces, passed the thirteenth day of March,
i815, shall not be construed to apply to any woman who shall have
had a bona fide residence in this state at least one whole year previous to filing her petition or libel."
This act prefixes the words "bona fide" to the word "residence." It is to be observed also that the bona fides of residence, is required only in the case of the woman. Judge Sulzberger adds that "this statute has not been expressly repealed."
In this regard, he fell into a slight error, for, by Section 2 of
an Act approved April 20, 1846, ' 2 entitled "An act to annul
the marriage contract between Jesse Benners and Harriet, his
wife, and for other purposes," it was enacted:
"That the provisions contained in the Act passed the eighteenth
day of April, A. D. 1843, which declares that the word 'citizen' as
'9 Maine
'

149.
R. . 87.

"P. L 340.
"P. L, (of 1847) 50O.
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used in the eleventh Section of the Act concerning divorces, passed
the thirteenth day of March, A. D. 1815, shall not be construed to
apply to any one who shall have a bona fide residence in the state
at least one whole year previous to filing said petition or libel, be,
and the same is hereby repealed."
Thus the term "bona fide" as a delimitation of the word
"residence," was eliminated from our Acts of Assembly, and
did not re-appear until the Act of May 8, 1854.1s
This Act of 1843 was passed upon by the Supreme Court
in Hollister v. Hollister, 4 where the parties were married and
domiciled in Pennsylvania, afterwards removed to Ohio, but
owing to cruel treatment by the husband, the wife returned to
her home in Pennsylvania, and instituted proceedings for
divorce. The court held in effect, that as she had re-acquired a
bona fide residence in this State, the requirement of citizenship
under the Act of i8i 5 , was fully met.
(3) Subsequently, the curative Act of February 27, I847,',
validated all divorces granted by the courts having jurisdiction
of the offence provided the offence were committed in this Commonwealth, and the libellant had resided therein one year or
more previous to the application for divorce, although, at the
time of the commission of the offence, both libellant and respondent may have been residents of another state: "Provided,
That in cases where the respondents resided out of this Commomcealth at the time of the preferment of the libels, personal
notice shall have been given to them." This statute, though
curative only, departed very materially from the rule laid down
in Dorsey v. Dorsey, and from the provisions of the Act of 1815
as to service of process: first,* in making the place where the
offence was committed the proper forum; and second, inrecognizing extra-territorial notice as the equivalent of service
within this State.
(4) By the Act of April 26, 185o6 two important jurisdictional changes were made. By Section 6 of the Act, the
:' P. L. 644; see No. 5, infra.

"6 Pa.44.
"P. L xg.
P. L 59o.
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courts were authorized (."to entertain jurisdiction in divorce for
the cause of desertion or adultery, notwithstanding the parties
were, at the time of the occurrence of said causes, domiciled
in any other state." This overturned entirely, the rule of Dorsey v. Dorsey, that the domicile, at the time and place of the
injury, is the proper forum. And the act further provides that
the applicant for divorce "shall be a, citizen of this Commonwealth, or shall have resided therein for the term of one year
as provided for by existing laws." This changes the Act of
1815 by omitting the word "and", and substituting the word
dor" ; so that the qualifications of citizenship and residence apparently became synonymous.
(5) All doubt in this regard was removed by Section 2
of the Act of May 8, 1854,17 which is entitled "A further Supplement to the Act entitled 'An Act concerning divorces."
Section i of this act increased the causes for divorce, and gives
to the husband also, the right of divorce for.cruel and barbarous
treatment by the wife. Section 2 provides that the word "citizen"
used in the eleventh section of the said Act (of 1815), shall not.
be so construed as to exclude "any party who shall, for one year,
have had a bona fide residence within this Commonwealth, previous to the filing of his or her petition or libel." This section
is practically a re-enactment of the Act of 1843, in that it
restores the requirement that the 'residence be bona fide; but it
goes further and gives to either party, instead of to the wife
alone, the right to obtain a divorce upon proving an actual, bona
fide residence for one year. Although some of the later acts
omit the term "bona fide," yet the courts have read these words
into all subsequent legislation. The jurisdictional importance of
the phrase "bona fide residence," will be shown later in discussing the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
(6) Next came the Act of March 9, 1855,1s which" extended the jurisdiction in divorce from the bonds of matrimony,
to the causes of personal abuse, or such conduct on the nart of
"p L 644.
"OP.L. M
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either husband or wife, as to render the condition of the other
party intolerable and life burdensome,
. .
notwithstanding the parties were, at the time of the
occurrence of the said causes, domiciled in another state: provided,
that the applicant shall be a citizen of this Commonwealth, or shall
have resided therein for a term of one year, as provided for by the
existing laws of this Commonwealth."
This proviso follows the exact language of the proviso to
Section 6, of the Act of i85o; but since the term "bona fide"
had been introduced by the Act of 1854, it would necessarily
be read into the words "the existing laws of this Commonwealth."
Both the Act of i85o and the Act of 1855 referred, however, to causes arising while the parties might be domiciled "in
any other state"; and in Bishop v. Bishop,"9 our Supreme Court
held that the words "any other state" meant only one of the
States of the Union, and not a foreign- country.
(7) Perhaps to overcome the effect of this decision, the
Legislature almost immediately passed the Act of April 22,
i858.20 If such was the intention, it was very bunglingly done.
Bishop v. Bishop was a case of alleged desertion occurring in
England; but the Act of x858 is entitled "A supplement to the
Act of March 9, i855," and extends the jurisdiction of said
latter act to all cases of divorce for the causes therein mentioned,
wherein either of the parties were, or may be, at the time of
the occurring of said cause, domiciled "in another state or
country." But the only causes mentioned in the Act of i855
were personal abuse and conduct rendering the condition of the
other parties intolerable and life burdensome. Therefore, in
McCartney v. McCartney,2" and Lewis v. Lewis, 22 it was held
that the Act of i8r8 did not extend to or embrace the causes
for divorce specified in the Act of 1850; to wit: desertion and
"13o Pa. 412.
"P. L. 450.
3"3o

W. N. C 132.

"6 Kulp 429; S. C. 2 D. R. 82.
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adultery. These last two decisions were rendered in 1892, at
which time the state of the law was as follows:
For the causes of adultery, desertion, truel and barbarous
treatment, personal abuse, or indignities, rendering life burdensome, the law of matrimonial domicile as enunciated in
Dorsey v. Dorsey, was entirely abolished as regards the other
State of the Union, and the injured party could invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State upon satisfactory proof
of bona fide residence therein for one year prior to filing his or
her petition or libel. In other words, legislation up to this point
gave our courts jurisdiction over the person of the libellant and
the subject matter of the action, upon proof of bono fide residence for one year, no matter where or when the offence occurred. But the law of domricile still remained in f6rce as regards foreign countries, except for the two causes of personal
abuse, or conduct rendering life burdensome, as provided by the
Act of March 9, 1855, and its supplement of April 22, 1858.
Up to this time, it had been held by our courts, almost
uniformly, that even though they had jurisdiction of a libellant
who had acquired a bona fide residence for one year, no matter
when or where the cause of divorce arose, yet jurisdiction over
the respondent would not be assumed unless personal service
of the subpoena had been made within this State;2 3 or the respondent had entered an appearance and defended the suit; or
had been served by "publication," where this State had been the
common matrimonial domicile, and the respondent, though
within the State, could not be found, or else had departed its
2
jurisdiction. '
(8) But new facts and new conditions were constantly
arising, to meet which it is the custom of our Legislature to
Ralston's Appeal, 93 Pa. 13.3 (where service was made in Delaware).
" Colvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375, where the court refused to recognize an
Iowa divorce against a wife who had remained in this State,-their matrimonial domicile: Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, where the court refused to recognize a Tennessee divorce in favor of a husband who had left his home in
this State. See also Allison v. Allison, 2 Pa. C. C. 671; Night v. Night, 2 Pa.
C. C. 574; Austin v. Austin, 4 Pa. C. C. 368; Davis v. Davis, 2 D. R. 62j;
Burdick v. Burdick, 2 D. R. 62.
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enact, in the guise of a general law, new provisions really intended to cover one or more particular instances.
(9) An illustration of this is found in the Act of June 20,
1893 .25 This act purports to extend the jurisdiction of our
courts in divorce, to the causes of adultery, desertion, cruel and
barbarous treatment and personal indignities (on the. part of
the husband only, however),, to a wife who was formerly a
citizen of this Commonwealth, but having removecf to another
state or a foreign country, has been compelled to-abandon such
other domicile for any of the acts aforesaid committed by her
husband. The act also requires that at the time of filing her
libel, the applicant shall be a citizen 28 of this Commonwealth or
shall have resided therein for the term of one year prior to
filing her libel as provided by the laws of this Commonwealth:
i. e., has a bona fide residence. The only change this act made
in the existing laws was to combine the causes specified in the
Acts of i85o and 1855; with the limitation, however, that the
wife alone, can proceed under this act, and the further limitations that she must have been a citizen of this Commonwealth,
before departing its jurisdiction, and be a citizen, or have a
bona fide residence for one year previous to filing her libel.
But the main purpose of this Act of 1893 seems to have
been to put an entering wedge under the rule uniformly maintained by our courts that jurisdiction of a non-resident respondent cannot be acquired by extra-territorial service of process,
"P. L 471.
It would seem that the true significance of the word "citizen" has

never been carefully considered by the draftsmen of our various divorce acts.
As applied to a citizen of the United States, the word connotes one who is

entitled to the protection of the Federal Government. But, as used in the
Act of 18ms, which requires that the libellant shall be a citizen of this Commonwealth. it has a very different and more limited meaning. Under this
act "citizenship" means and can only mean residence "animna manendi" The
Acts of 1843, 1847, i854, all directed that the word "citizen" should be construed to mean any person who should have had a bona fide residence within
this State for at least one year. But take the case of a woman, a resident
from birth of this Commonwealth, who marries an English subject. By
such marriage she becomes an English citizen, and her return to this country
and this State cannot divest her of her English citizenship. Therefore, the
clause in the proviso of this act, that, at the time of filing her application
for divorce, the applicant therefor "shall be a citizen of this Commonwealth," is meaningless.
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or by notice of the suit brought; for the first proviso to section
one of this act enacts:
"That where in any such case, personal service of the subpoena
cannot be made upon such husband by reason of his non-residence
within this Commonwealth, the Court, before entering a decree of
divorce, shall require proof that in addition to the publication now
required by law, actual or constructive notice of said proceeding has
been given to such non-resident husband, either by, personal service-or by registered letter to his last known place of residence, and that
a reasonable time has thereby been afforded to him to appear and
defend in said suit."
Such service or notice is futile to confer jurisdiction against
never domiciled in this State.2 7
non-resident
a
It may be noted in passing that the Act of 1893 embraces
both divorce from the bonds of matrimony and divorce from
bed and board, while the Acts of 185o, 1854, i855 and x858 confer jurisdiction in cases of divorce a vincido, only.
Numerous cases pro and con came before the courts during the following ten years. In a few instances the courts
granted divorces where the respondent was never a resident
of or subject to the jurisdiction of this State, and where service
by publication only, or by actual extra-territorial service or
notice -was made or given; but the majority of the courts refused to entertain jurisdiction in such cases.
But, as suggested by Judge Sulzberger, in Lyon v. Lyon,
new conditions arose after the war with Spain, and this country
having established political relations with Hawaii, Porto Rico
and the Philippine Islands, it became doubtful whether the terms
"another state or country" (used in the Act of 1858), or the
words "foreign country" (used in the Act of 1893), "could
with propriety, be applied to them."
(io) Therefore, the Legislature, to cover these new conditions, passed the Act of April 28, 1903.28 This act is entitled
"See Reel v. Eider, 62 Pa. 3o8; Ralston's Appeal, 93 Pa. 133; Oakley v.
Oakley, i D. R. 779; Burdick v. Burdick, 2 D. R. 622, which last two'cases
construed a similar provision in the Act of June 8, i8gi, P. L. 247, subsequently supplied and repealed by the above mentioned Act of 1893.
" P. L. 326.
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"A Supplement to an Act extending the jurisdiction of the
courts of this Commonwealth in cases of divorce, passed April
26, i85o."
This Act of 1903 embraces desertion by husband or wife,
adultery of either husband or wife, personal abuse by either,
or conduct on the part of either, such as to render life burdensome, and cruel and barbarous treatment on the part of the
husband;
.. ..notwithstanding the said causes of divorce have occurred, or shall hereafter occur in a foreign country, or in a country, state or territory, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States :-and provided that no application, for such divorce shall be
made, unless at the time the said cause or causes of divorce occurred, the applicant therefor, was a citizen of this Commonwealth:provided further, that the said applicant shall have resided therein
for the term of one year as provided for by the existing laws of this
Comionwealth:"
Assuming that the main purpose of this act was, as suggested in Lyon v. Lyon, to provide for cases arising in our territorial possessions it is to be noted first; that while the Act of
1893 applies to divorce both from the bonds of matrimony and
from bed and board, the Act of i9o3 applies to divorces from
the bonds of matrimony only. Second, That the Act of 1903,
adds to the causes mentioned in the Act of 1893, "personal
abuse, etc., on the part of either husband or wife," and also
"cruel treatment and indignities on the part of the husband."
Further, the Act of 1903 makes no reference to manner of
service upon a non-resident respondent. And while the Act of
1903 contains no repealing clause, yet inasmuch as it is a "supplement" to the Act of 1850, it, in effect, goes back to the cumulative requirement of the Act of 1815, in that its provisos require not only that the applicant shall have been 4 citizen of this
Commonwealth at the time the cause of the divorce occurred,
but also (and) that the applicant shall have resided in this Commonwealth for the term of one year, etc. In other words, both
citizenship and residence as required in the Act of i8i 5 , but
abolished by the Acts of 1843, 1847 and 1854, are restored in
all cases to which the enacting clause of this act is applicable.
The case of Lyon v. Lyon further shows that this- acd can-
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not apply to residents of different States of the Union, but only
to residents of a "foreign country, or of a country, state or
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
Up to this time, our courts had been quite chary of assuming jurisdiction over a non-resident respondent, without personal service of process within this State, or by constructive
service where such respondent had departed this jurisdiction;
obeying very generally the dictum of Chief Justice Gibson, in
Dorsey v. Dorsey,29 that an attempt to bind a party not subject
to the jurisdiction of our courts, without hearing or notice,
would be extravagant, and contrary to the nature of our political
system.
The Subject Matter in Divorce Proceedings.
The question of the effect and validity of what have been
termed "migratory divorces," where serivice, "by publication
only," was made, according to the laws of the State granting
the divorce, was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the
United States in several cases between the years goi and
i9o6;30 and the final conclusion arrived at was that a decree
in divorce granted by any State which had jurisdiction of the
person of the libellant only, was not entitled to "full faith and
credit" in any other State, unless personal service had been made
upon the respondent within the State issuing the process, or
unless the respondent had left the common matrimonial domicile,
or had appeared and defended the suit.
Three vital principles are involved in these United States
Supreme Court decisions.
First: Is the law of the common matrimonial domicile the
controlling factor?
7 Watts 352.
'Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155; Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 375; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179; Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183; Andrew$
v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; German Savings Bank v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125;
Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317; Haddock v. Haddock. 201 U S. s62.
The jurisdictional principle laid down in Atherton v. Atherton, that the
proper forum in divorce proceedings is the forum of the common matrimopercolated very slowly through the professional and legisnial
mind. has
lativedonicile,
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Second: Is the matrimonial status divisible or indivisible?
words, does each party to the marriage relation take
other
In
with him or her, the matrimonial status wherever either may
go, so as to authorize the courts of the newly acquired residence
to assume jurisdiction of the marital status, simply because
either has become a resident of such other State?
Third: Is, therefore, the:.ratrimonial status of one of the
parties to the marriage such a "res" as to warrant the assumption of jurisdiction by the court of any State (to which either
party may migrate), over the matrimonial status of such "new
citizens," and grant a decree in divorce bifding upon the other
party to the marriage, even though such other party may have
had no notice of the divorce proceedings other than "by publication" within the state where the libellant happens to be
residing?
That not a little confusion exists as to what is the true res,
or subject matter, in cases for divorce is very apparent from
even the most superficial examination of the cases which have
been- decided by the courts of nearly every state and by the
Supreme Court of the United States. This confusion arises
largely from the divergence of perspectives focussing upon the
central thought of what will confer jurisdiction in divorce proceedings. One line of reasoning lays chief stress upon the rights
of the individual, treating the marriage relation as a matter
of contract only. The opposite line of reasoning has greater
regard for the interests of society, and views the marriage
relation as an institution, "in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress." 31
Marriage of course has its origin in contract, founded upon
the agreement of the parties, but that contract once executed,
a matrimonial relation, or status, is created which the parties of
themselves cannot change. "This matrimonial status is subject
to the control of the Legislature, which defines its mode of
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 2o.
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inception, its duties and obligations, its effects upon the property rights of both parties, and the conditions upon which it
may be dissolved." 32
The subject matter in divorce proceedings therefore, is the
matrimonial statiq, and not the person alone of either party to
the marriage. The jurisdiction of the courts over such status
depends primarily upon the locus in quo of that status, i.e.,
upon the domicile of both parties to the marriage relation.
Ways of Affecting the MatrimonialStati.
But the matrimonial status may be affected in the following different ways:
(a) Both parties may remove to another jurisdiction and
acquire a new bona fide domicile. If so, it makes no difference
where the cause of divorce arises; the courts of the new domicile
have jurisdiction of the status because they have jurisdiction of
both of the parties.
(b) The husband may, in good faith remove to another
state animo macndL In such case his new domicile by force
of legal presumption-legal fiction-becomes the domicile of
the wife.3 3 In such case also it makes no difference where the
cause of divorce arises. The courts of the new State will have
jurisdiction of the status, and constructively of the person of
the wife.3 '
(c) The husband may, inald fide, remove to another State.
This was the case in Haddock v. Haddock. How can it be said
that he took the matrimonial status with him? His very wrong,
his offense against the status of the parties, destroyed his right
to enforce the legal fiction that his new domicile became his
wife's, and she, eo instanti,acquired the right to retain a separate
domicile in New York, the State where they were married. That
]Ibid.
=

Bishop on Divorce: Sections

12,

1z8;

Haddock v. Haddock,

2oz U.

Hladdock, 2o

U. S.

S. 56z, 391.
'Burlen v. Shannon, zis Mass. 439; Haddock v.
591, 619.

352

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

was their de facto matrimonial domicile, and had her husband's
offense been the cause for which alone- divorce a z'incido is
recognized in New York she could have obtained such a divorce
by constructive service.8
(d) Both parties.may remove bona fide to another State,
the husband then become the offending party, and the wife for
his fault return to the former matrimonial domicile. In such
case the courts of many States recognize her right to a divorce,
she having rieturned to their former matrimonial domicile.
(e) If under "d", supra, the wife becomes the offending
party the husband can bring suit either in their new domicile or
can acquire another domicile and bring suit there, because of
the legal fiction that the husband's domicile is the wife's, until
a wrongful act on his part.
(f) The wife may, ,withoutcause on the part of the husband,
remove to her former or a new domicile. In such case he can
sue in the jurisdiction which she has left; but she cannot sue
in their new domicile, because her husband's domicile is still
8
hers. 6
(g) The wife may, for cause on the part of the husband,
leave their matrimonial domicile and remove to her former or
even to a new domicile. In such case the husband can sue in
the jurisdiction which she has left.3 7 And it is claimed that
she should be allowed to sue in the domicile to which she has
removed on the ground that through her husband's fault the
legal fiction that the husband's domicile is that of the wife no
longer obtains; But this state of facts has not been passed upon
as yet by the United States Supreme Court. The nearest approach is found in the case of Show v. Shaw, 38 where the parties
were married in Massachusetts, lived there and left together
for the purpose of settling in Colorado. On the.journey, at
Philadelphia, the wife was forced by the cruelty of her husband
Shaw v. Shaw, 99 Mass. is.
fBurlen v. Shannon. x.% Mass. 439; Hood v. Hood, t-o Mass. 46;
Cheeiy v. Clayton, i o U. S. 7oi; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. SS.
't Atherton v. Atherton, jaupra.
098 Mass. 358.
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to leave him. She returned to Massachusetts, while he went on
to Colorado. She instituted divorce proceedings in Massachusetts, the husband being brought in by substituted service
only. The court recognized that a decree of divorce to have
extra-territorial effect must be based upon jurisdiction of both
parties; but they held that at the time of the commission of
the cruelty in Philadelphia the domicile of the parties in Massachusetts had not been lost, and that she was justified in returning to Massachusetts, and that the courts of that State, it being
still the matrimonial domicile, could acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent by substituted service.
Bishop on "Marriage and Divorce" has been recognized
very generally as an authority to the point that, where the court
had jurisdiction of the person of the libellant, it also had jurisdiction of the subject matter, so that it is very difficult for
lawyers or legislators to get away from his reasoning, which,
in substance, amounts to the assertion that the res in divorce
proceedings is the status of the libellant in- relation to the respondent, which relation being before the court in the person
of the libellant the court has jurisdiction of the matrimonial
status of both. Mr. Justice Brown in his dissenting opinion in
Haddock v. Haddock0 9 adopts, curn favore, this point of view.
But it is rather difficult to reconcile his recognition of the rightfulness of the decisions of the same court in Bell v. Bell,40 and
Streitwolf v. Streitwoif,41 where the bona fides of the residence
of the libellant was attacked, and it was held that the decree of
the State granting the divorce was not entitled to any force or
validity in another State, under Article IV of the United States
Constitution.
The very fact that these two cases assert the right of any'
court to attack the bona fides of the residence of the libellant,
(or of any other jurisdictional fact), seems a most clear and
conclusive adoption of the principle that the common matri"2oi U. S. 562, 624.
18x U. S. 175.
1 U. S. 179.
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monia! domicile, as declared in Atherton v. Atherton, is the
42
proper forum in divorce proceedings. Andrews v. Andre=s,
goes even further, and holds not only that the bona fides of
residence may be inquired into a collateral proceeding, but also
that vhere the libellant had plainly acquired a new residence for
the purpose of evading the law of his matrimonial domicile, an
appearance by attorney for the respondent did not estop. her from
attacking the validity of the decree in divcorce granted in another
State.
Haddock v. Haddock 43 gathers up all the .arguments, pro
and con, upon the question of the true res in divorce proceedings; and it may now be quite safely asserted that decrees in
divorce, where the court had jurisdiction of the person of the
'libellant only, and where service "by publication only," or even
by registered letter, was made upon the respondent, will not
and cannot affect .the marital or property rights of the respondent, or of the children to the marriage outside of the State
where the divorce is granted; that a decree so obtained can
have no force or effect beyond the boundaries of the State granting the same; that it may be attacked directly or collaterally;
that if the libellant obtaining such a decree, marries again in
another State, he may be indicted for bigamy should he return to the former matrimonial domicile; his children by the
second marriage be declared illegitimate; and that he can retain
property rights against his divorced wife only in the State granting the divorce.
B. As to Evidence.
Under the common law neither husband nor wife could
testify against each other. Even the Act of April 15, 1869, did
not change the law in this respect. But the Act of March 4,
x87o, 4 4 permitted:
"The testimony of either husband or wife to be given in his or
her own behalf in any proceeding for a divorce, in every case where
288 U. S. 14.
U. S. 562.

632ox

"P. L. 36.
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personal service of the subpoena is inade on the opposite party, or
said party appears and defends."

The provisions of this Act of 187o, were re-enacted and
enlarged by the Act of May 23, I887, 45 by the following
language,
"Except in those proceedings for divorce in which personal
service of the subpoena, or of a rule to take depositions has been
made upoii the opposite party, or in which the opposite party appears and defends, in which case either may testify fully against the
other; and except also that in any proceeding for divorce either
party may be called merely to prove the fact of marriage."
I.

THE SUPPOSED MISCHIEF OR DEFECT.

Much has been written concerning the causes that prompt
the constantly increasing number of applications for divorce.
Revolt against Ecclesiasticism, says one: Assertion of the
Spirit of the Protestant Right of Individual Judgment, says
another: The question is purely Economic, says a third. Someone has very naively argued that the right of divorce (marriage
being purely a matter of contract), is secured by that provision
of the Constitution which defines as one of the "certain inherent
and indefeasible rights," secured to all, that "of pursuing their
own happiness." The state of social unrest concerning the
marriage relation may perhaps be attributed to failure of respect
for authority, whether of church or state; to loss of the ideals
of duty and obedience; in other words, to the insistence by both
youths and their elders upon "being a law unto themselves!';
not having learned that no one has the right to do a thing that,
if everybody did, would make the world worse not better.
But, psychology aside, the trend of subsequent divorce
legislation in Pennsylvania indicates very strongly a desire to
escape from the ruling in Atherton v. Atherton, and Haddock v.
Haddock; First, that the common matrimonial domicile is the
proper forum in divorce proceedings, and: Second, that no
respondent'in divorce can be bound by the decree of a State of
which he was never a resident without personal service within
that State, or unless"he appears and defends the action.
"P. L 158, Sec. 5.
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Formerly too, there were many instances where residents of

Peninsvlvania, for one reason and another, resorted to the courts
of Delaware and New Jersey and obtained divorces which they
would not or could not have 6btained in Pennsylvania. But.
after the adoption by New Jersey in 1907, and by Delaware in
1908 of the Uniform Divorce Act, with its stricter jurisdictional
provisions, 48 these States ceased to be a Mecca for divorce
litigants.
These jurisdictional provisions were as follows:
Jurisdiction of the Courts.
Section 7. For purposes of annulment of marriage, jurisdiction may be
acquired by personal service upon the respondent within this Commonwealth
when either party is a bona-fide resident of this Commonwealth at the time
of the commencement of the action.
Section 8. For purposes of divorce, either absolute or from bed and
bboard, jurisdiction may be acquired by personal service upon the respondent
within this Commonwealth, under the following conditions:
a. When, at the time the cause of action arose, either party was a bona
fide resident of this Commonwealth. and has continued so to be down to the
time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for -absolute
divorce shall be commenced for any cause other than adultery or bigamy,
unless one of the parties has been for the two years next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth.
b. When, since the cause of action arose, either party has become, and
for at least two years next preceding the commencement of the action has
continued to be, a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth: Provided, The
cause of action alleged was recognized in the jurisdiction in which such party
resided at. the time the cause of action arose, as a ground for the same reliei
asked for in the action in this Commonwealth.
Section 9. When the respondent cannot be served personally within this
Commonwealth, and when at the time of the commencement of the action
the libellant is a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth, jurisdiction for
the purpose of Annulment of Marriage may be acquired by publication, to
be followed wh~re practicable by service upon or notice to the respondent
without this Commonwealth, or by additional substituted service upon the
respondent within this Commonwealth, as prescribed by section 28 of this
act. Section io.
When the respondent cannot be served
personally within
this Commonwealth, and when at the time of the commencement of the
action the libellant is a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth, jurisdiction
for the purpose of divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, may be
"acquired by publication, to be followed where practicable by service upon or
notice to the respondent without this Commonwealth, or by additional substituted service upon the respondent within this Commonwealth as prescribed
by section 28 of this act, under the following conditions:
a. When, at the time the cause of action arose, the libellant was a bona
fide resident of this Commonwealth, and has continued so to be down to the
time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for absolute
divorce shall be commenced for any cause other than adultery or bigamy,
unless the libellant has been for the two years next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth.
b. When, since the cause of action arose, the libellant has become, and
for at least two years next preceding the commencement of the action has
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continued to be a bona fide resident of this Commonwealth: Provided, The
cause of action alleged was recognized in the jurisdiction in which the libellant resided at the time the cause of action arose, as a ground for the same
relief asked for in the action in this Commonwealth.
Service of Process.
Section 27. If upon the return of the alias or any pluries subpoena or
subpoenas it appears that the respondent cannot be fouid within this Con
monwealth to be served with process, then the court or judge awarding the
subpoena may order the sheriff to cause notice to be published in one or
more newspapers, if any, of general circulation published in the city or
county of this Commonwealth wherein the libellant resides, and also in the
city or county where the respondent had his or her last known residence;
or if no newspaper be published in such city or county, then in such newspaper or newspapers nearest thereto, as the court may direct, once each week
for six successive weeks prior to the first day of the next or any succeeding
term of court, requiring the said respondent to enter an appearance on or
before said day, and to file an answer within thirty days thereafter.
Section 28. If the place of residence of the respondent is within this
Commonwealth. and is known to or can be ascertained by the libellant, but
the respondent cannot be found within this Commonwealth to be served
with process, then and in that case, in addition to the publication provided
for by section 27 of this act, the court shall order a copy of the subpoena
and libel, with the notice prescribed by section 23 of this act endorsed thereon.
to be served by the proper official, in any one of the following methods:
a. By handing a true and attested copy thereof to an adult member of
the respondent's family, at his or her dwelling house: or.
b. To an adult member of the family with which the respondent resides; or,
c. At the respondent's place of residence, to the manager or clerk of the
hotel, apartment house, boarding house, or other place of lodging at which
the respondent resides; or,
d. At the respondent's place of business, to his or her agent, partner, or
the person for the time being in charge thereof, if for any cause an attempt
to serve at the respondent's residence has failed.
Section 29. If the place of residence of the respondent is out of this
Commonwealth. and is known to or can be ascertained by the liellant. then
and in that case. in addition to the publication hereinbefore provided for. the
court shall order notice to be served upon the respondent, either by personal
service of a copy of the libel, within a time to be fixed by the order, or by
registered letter containing a copy of the same. in case such personal service
cannot be made; or in case the exact address of the respondent cannot be
ascertained, then by publication in a newspaper of general circulation printed
in the county and State where such respondent is known io reside, or if a
foreign country, in the nearest center of population to the residence of the
respondent, once each week for six successive weeks prior to the first day
of the next or any succeeding term of court, with the same requirements as
to appearance and filing of an answer as hereinbefore prescribed.
Full Faith and Credit Clause, etc.
Section 81. Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this
State to a decree of annulment of marriage or divorce by a court of competent iurisdiction in another State. territory or possession of the United
States when the jurisdiction of such court was obtained in the manner and
in substantial conformity with the conditions prescribed in sections 7, 8, 9,and
io. of this act. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit the
power of any court to give such effect to a. decree7 of annulment or divorce
by a court of a foreign country as may be iustified by the rules of international comity: Provided, That if any inhabitant of this Commonwealth
shall go- into another State, territory or country in order to obtain a decree

358

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Then too, the rule laid down by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Middleton v. Middleton,47 and by the Superior Court
in Howe v. Howe,45 Englisl; v. Englih,49 and Edgar v. Edgar,30
that not only must the lower courts carefully scrutinize the testimony on the part of a libellant as to the facts constituting the
cause of divorce, but also that the higher courts would themselves examine into the sufficiency of such testimony, notwithstanding the findings of the master and of the court below, made
it much more difficult than before to "slip a divorce case
through." There had been numerous violations of the requirements of the Act of May 23, 1887, which permitted a libellant
to testify only where jurisdiction had been acquired of the respondent by personal service of the subpoena, or of a rule to
take depositions, or where the opposite party appeared and defended. These limitations in the Act of 1887 were jurisdictional in character and utterly precluded anything but common law proof on the part of the libellant where service had
been made "by publication only." At the threshold of each
divorce case lies the jurisdictional fact of the bona fide residence
of the libellant within this State for the prescribed period.
Under the Act of 1887 the libellant was not a competent witness to prove even his period of residence, much less his bona
fides or aninum manendi, unless the conditions prescribed by
that act had been fulfilled. This is shown in Lyon v. Lyon,"
which case is a pregnant illustration of the countless attempts
made to evade the varioub legislative restrictions in divorce procedure, and the decisions of the higher courts.
Therefore, to overcome these jurisdictional and evidential
obstacles, resort was had to the legislature; so that we shall now
consider:
of divorce for a cause which occurred while the parties resided in this Corn.
monwcalth, or for a cause which is not ground for divorce under the laws
of this Commonwealth a decree so obtained shall be of no force or effect in
this Commonwealth.
41 87 Pa. 612.
1x6 Pa. Super. Ct. z93.
19 Pa. Super. Ct. SM.
23 Pa. Super. Ct. 23o.
13 D. R. 623.
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III. THE REMEDY' AND ITs EFFECT.

(i) The first act to be considered is that of June 8, i911,52
which reads as follows:
"An act enabling the libellant in all proceedings for divorce on
the ground of desertion to testify to the fact of desertion, and to
the efforts made by him or her to induce the respondent to return
and resfime the marital relation.
"Section i. Be it enacted, &c., That in all proceedings for divorce on the ground of desertion, the libellant shall be fully competent to prove the fact of desertion, and the efforts, if any, made by

him or her to induce the respondent to return and resume the marital relation, though the respondent may not have been personally
served with the subpoena or with a rule to take depositions, and
may not be residing within this Commonwealth, but has been served
by publication only.
"Section 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith be

and the same are hereby repealed."
From the face of the title this act appears to be very innocuous, in that, prima fade, it relates solely to "the law of
evidence." But the enacting clause of the act involves not only
the rules of evidence, but also the jurisdiction of the courts;
in this, that the act authorizes the testimony of the libellant to
be given to prove the "fact of desertion," etc., even "though the
respondent may not have been personally served cith the mbpoena or with a ride to take depositions, and may not be-residing aithin this Commonwealth, but has been served by publication only."
This Act of 1911 was evidently passed to overcome the
decision in Davenport v. Davenport,5 3 where the testimony of
the libellant as to the desertion complained of, was rejected, as
there had been "no personal service of the subpoena or a rule
to take depositions upon the opposite party nor had the opposite
party appeared and defended" as required by the Act of May
23, 1887, P. L. i58.
The act is uncertain in that it uses the phrase "though the
respondent . . . nav not be residing within this Com-

monwealth." If this means that he must have been a former
"P. L 2o.

"i 7 D. R. too5.
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resident but "may not be residing" therein at the time of suit
brought, then service by publication would be guthorized, and
the privilege of testifying to the fact of desertion is in such a
case properly extended to the libelant as against the respondent,
who had once been subject to -the jurisdiction of this State, but
had departed therefrom.
But the phrase "may not be residing within this Commonwealth" is capable of being so construed as to permit a libellant
to testify against the respondent, even though the respondent
had never been a resident of this State, and therefore never
subject to the jurisdiction of its courts.
The act is also misleading in its use of the phrase, "but
has been served by publication only." The Act of March 13,
i815, authorizes publication, only where the respondent cannot
be found within the county where suit is brought; but our
courts have extended this not only to cases where the respondent
could not be found within the county, yet still might be residing within the State, but also to cases where the respondent had
formerly been subject to the jurisdiction of the State courts and
had departed to another State. Beyond this, under the Act
of 1815, the courts had never gone, refused always to recognize
the validity of service by publication where the respondent had
But the
never been subject to the jurisdiction of this State5
Act of May 9, 1913,55 which will be discussed later, has been
construed to change the law relating to jurisdiction over the
respondent, so that it is more than probable that our courts,
first assuming jurisdiction in any and all cases over an absent
respondent, will permit the libellant to testify against the respondent though he has never had his day in court, or any
notice whatever of the proceeding, whereby he might have
the opportunity to appear and defend. Such right is secured to
a defendant in all personal actions relating to his property or his
person, and it seems a strange perversion of right and justice
that so far as concerns the most intimate of personal relations
See Beckett v. Beckett, 24 D. R. 37.
P. L. 191.

M
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this right of self-protection should be denied. This Act of '9"1
has been construed in a number of cases."
(2)

The next act in order of time is that of May 9, 1913,5

which is as follows:
"An act relating to divorce:
"Section i. Be it enacted, &c., That the several courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction in any action in divorce, for any
cause now or hereafter allowed by law, notwithstanding the fact
that the marriage of the parties and the cause for divorce occurred
outside of this Commonwealth, and that both parties were at the
time of the occurrence of said cause domiciled without this Commonwealth, and that the respondent has been seived with the subpoena only by publication as required by law. In such cases the
libellant shall be a competent witness to prove his or her residence
within this Commonwealth.
"Section 2. The said courts shall also entertain jurisdiction of
all cases of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, for any cause
now or hereafter provided for by law, when the libellant or applicant for such divorce shall, at the time of filing the petition or libel
in divorce, have been a resident of this Commonwealth for one year
previous to the filing of the petition or libel in divorce."
(s) Klinger v. Klinger. 22 D. R. 97, where the parties were married
and lived for some time in this State. then went to California where after a
month the husband deserted his wife and she returned to this State. the
former matrimonial domicile (service "by publication only"), being fully
warranted in such a case. Judge Endlich held that the Act of IQI . being
remedial, was entitled to a liberal construction, and therefore permitted the
wife to testify fully as to all facts tending to prove a legal desertion, as well
as to the fact of desertion itself.
(2) Wilson v. Wilson. 22 D. R. 769. The matrimonial domicile was in
Philadelphia. and the desertion occurred there, so service by publication was
the proper procedure. But the court. Barrett, J., restricted the testimony of
the wife. the libellant. to the facts relating to the desertion and excluded her
testimony as to cruel treatment, indignities, etc.
(3) Collacott v. Collacott, 24 D. R. 926. The matrimonial domicile was
in Luzerne County. The husband went to Australia. There was no service
by publication after the return of the alias subpoena; but only a letter mailed
to the husband in Australia two weeks before the date of hearing. The
court held that the testimony of the libellant as to the fact of desertion was
too meager: that since the Act of i9i makes the libellant a competent witness as to the cause of divorce, much fuller and more explicit proof should
be required than before its passage.
(4) Buys v. Buys, s6 Pa. Super. Court 338. The matrimonial domicile
was in Brooklyn. The husband brought suit in Philadelphia. The court
held that under the Act of igii the courts will scrutinize with great care the
uncorroborated festimonv of the libellant as to the facts constituting desertion. The question of jurisdiction was not raised in this case, though it
might well have been, since the respondent had never been a resident of this
State.
" P. L 191.
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This act is both jurisdictional and evidential. In so far
as it affects the rules of evidence, it goes a step further than the
preceding Act of June 8, 1911, in that it permits the libellant,
in all cases, to testify against the respondent not only to prove
the fact of marriage or of desertion, but also to prove the libellant's residence within this Commonwealth. While, of course,
such residence must be for the prescribed period -of one year
before instituting suit, yet it is to be noted that the limiting
phrase bona fide is omitted. Prior to this act proof of a bona
fide residence could be made only through the testimony of
other witnesses, except where jurisdiction of the person of the
respondent had been obtained.58 But this act permits the testimony of the libellant to be given even though the respondent
had never resided within this State, or been subject to its jurisdiction, but had been served "by publication only." Therefore,
there is no limit to the right of the libellant to testify against an
absent respondent who has never had any notice whatever of
the proceedings against him.
Residence of the libellant is a jurisdictional fact. It had
proved difficult in many cases for a libellant to prove bona fides
of his or her residence, i. e., animum manendi. The bona fides
was, therefore, largely a matter of inference for the court. But
this act opens the door for a libellant to testify not only to overt
acts from which the inference of a bona fide residence might
irresistibly be drawn, but also to testify to motives and purposes.
If this evidential clause were the only feature of the act,
little harm might result, since our higher courts, as stated above,
will examine and scrutinize with great care the testimony of
any libellant as to any jurisdictional fact, especially where the
respondent had no opportunity to appear and defend. But this
clause permitting the libellant to testify as t3 the fact of residence is the least objectionable feature of the act, for the first
section of the act expressly confers jurisdiction upon the court
a. . in any action in divorce, for any cause now or here"See Lyon v. Lyon, 3 . It 623.
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after allowed at law, notwithstanding the fact that the marriage of
the parties and the cause for divorce occurred outside of this
Commonwealth, and that both parties were at the time of the occurrence of said cause domiciled without this Commonwealth, and that
the respondent has been served with the subpoena only by publication, as required by law."
This language, literally construed, is capable of but one
interpretation, namely,, that it was the purpose of the legislature,
as suggested in Christmas v. Christmas,9 to confer jurisdiction
upon our courts in all cases where the court has neither jurisdiction of the subject-matter, because the marital domicile of
the parties at the time the cause of divorce arose was without
the State, nor of the person of the respondent, -for the reason
that no personal service had been made upon the respondent.
The phrase "publication as required by law" would formerly
have been construed as permitting publication only where the
respondent had departed from the matrimonial domicile in this
State. But the positive provision of the preceding part of the
section conferring jurisdiction where the parties were married
outside of the State, the cause of divorce occurred outside of the
State, and both parties at the time were domiciled without this
State, seems to indicate clearly the legislative intent to overturn the principle of matrimonial domicile laid down in Atherton v. Atherton,6" and Haddock v. Haddock.6 2 The act has
2
been so construed by our lower courts in Driver v. Driver,8
Christmas v. Christmas,3 and Clark v. Clark, 4 but has not
been passed uppn as yet by either the Superior Court or the
Supreme Court.
5
In Driver v. Driver,"
the court granted a divorce to a wife
who had been deserted by her husband in New York State
(where desertion is not a cause for absolute divorce), and came
to Philadelphia to live. The husband was never within the
D. R. 34% 352181 U. S. 155.
201 U. S. 562
24 D. 1L 250.
24 D. R. 34g.
4 D. R. 47s.
Note 62, SNuO.
2
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jurisdiction of this State. Service was made by publication
only.
In Christmas v. Christmas," the parties were married and
lived in Virginia. The husband was guilty of adultery. The
wife came to Pittsburgh and, after the required time of residence, instituted proceedings in divorce. A decree was granted
on the strength of this Act of 1913. The court in its opinion
uses the following language:
"This divorce will not be effective beyond the limits of the
State of Pennsylvania. If this libellant should marry again and
return to Virginia, she is subject to criminal prosecution in that
State, if the authorities desire to prosecute her. Any children which
she may have as the result of any subsequent marriage would be
illegitimate in any other State of the union except in Pennsylvania.
These are circumstances which it is not pleasant to contemplate by
any court as probable results of its decree, but the responsibility for
that situation is not with this court, but with the legislature. The
legislature has directed this court to take jurisdiction of this case
and the responsibility for that act is with the legislature. The voice
of the legislature announces the public policy of the State."
In Clark v. Clark,"7 the court goes even farther. The
parties lived in New York. The cruel treatment by the husband
compelled the wife to leave him, whereupon she came to Pennsylvania. The court granted her a decree in divorce, largely
upon the merits it is true, but expressly held that jurisdiction
had been conferred by this Act of 1913, and says in its opinion:
"Even if it be true that a divorce granted under these circumstances will be of no validity beyond the limits of Pennsylvania, that
is a matter more for the contemplation of the parties than for the
consideration of the court. The legislature has enacted the law, and
the duty of the court is to administer it."
In the light of the fundamental principles established by
the decisions of the United States Courts as to the proper res
or subject-matter in divorce proceedings, the proper forum in
such cases, the right of defendant, in divorce proceedings as
well as in personal actiohs, to be served personally, or to have
notice of the suit so that he may appear and defend (substituted
"Note 63. suora.
' Note 64, supra.
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service by publication being permissible only where the respondent has left the matrimonial domicile), all of which are jurisdictional factors, this Act of 1913, has two aspects that "leap
to the eye." It is either a trap for the innocent and unwary, or
it is an open door to that "easy divorce," for which there has of
recent years been so great a demand. It is a blot upon our laws.
One result will be to make Pennsylvania formerly one of the
most conservative of states, a second Reno.
One voice alone has been raised in protest The court in
Beckett v. Beckett, 8 held:
"This enactment adds nothing to existing law. Whenever the
courts now have jurisdiction they will continue, to have jurisdiction.
Nothing more and nothing less. They acquire no jurisdiction by
virtue of this statute. Former statutes permitted jurisdiction to be
acquired by publication only under certain conditions. This new
law is plainly not intended to make publication the only form of
service. The statute must therefore be construed to mean that
whenever personal service of the subpoena or alias cannot be had,
service may be made by publication as prescribed by former statutes
upon any one who, by reason of previous domicile, is subject to the

laws of the Commonwealth in matters relating to his marriage or
divorce. As the respondent was never personally domiciled in Pennsylvania, the Act of I9M3 does not apply to him."
This language is in consonance with the United States Supreme Court decisions.
(3) Then followed, as a natural corollary, the Act of
April 21, i915,9 which reads as follows:

"An act to amend the first section of an act, entitled 'An act enabling the libellant in all proceedings for divorce on the ground of
desertion to testify to the fact of desertion, and to the efforts made
by him or her to induce the respondent to return and resume the
marital relation,' approved June eighth, Anno Domini one thousand
nine hundred and eleven, by making the libellant a competent witness generally.
"Section i. Be it enacted, &c., That section one of an act, entitled 'An act enabling the libellant in all proceedings for divorce on
the ground of desertion to testify to the fact of desertion, and to
the efforts made by him or her to induee the respondent to, return
and- resume the marital relation,' approved the eighth day of June,
024 D. R. 37.
0 P L i54.
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Anno Domini one thousand nine hundred and eleven, which reads as
follows:
"'Section i. That in all proceedings for divorce on the
ground of desertion, the libellant shall be fully competent to prove

the fact of desertion, and the efforts, if any, made by'him or her to
induce the respondent to return and resume the marital relation,

though the respondent may not have been personally served with the
subpoena or with a rule to take depositions, and may not be residing
within this Commonwealth, but has been served by publication only,
be so amended as to read:
"Section i. That in all proceedings for divorce the libellant
shall be fully competent to prove all the facts, though the respondent
may not have been personally served with a libel, subpoena, or rule
to take depositions, and may not be residing within the Commonwealth, but has been served by publication only."

This act lowers almost completely the bars of that policy of
the law which prevented husband and wife from testifying
against each other. But since questions of evidence, like questions of procedure, limitations, usury, &c., are matters of public
policy to be determined by the legislature, so long as no constitutional rights are violated, any criticism of this act could be
academic only, were it not for the fact that it again repeats the
jurisdictional phrase appearing in the Act of June 8, 19ii, and
the Act of May 9, 1913; to wit, "May not be residing within
the Commonwealth, but ha been served by publication only."
Therefore, since the courts in construing the Act of May 9,
1913, seem inclined to follow the dictates of the legislature
rather than the principles relating to jurisdiction over a nonresident, as defined by the United States Supreme Court, it is
more than probable that in all future cases they will first assume
jurisdiction in all cases to which the Act of May 9, 1913, seems
applicable, and then admit testimony ad libituin by the libellant
against the absent respondent, except in so far as restrained by
the decisions of the Superior Court and of the Supreme Court
above referred to, with respect to careful scrutiny of the testimony of the libellant as to the facts constituting the cause of
divorce.
There seems to be as yet no reported case involving a construction of this Act of i915.' It is to be hoped that both the
Act of 1913, and this later Act of 1915 may soon be put to.
the acid test of a careful consideration by our appellate courts.

DIVORCE LEGISLATION IN PENNSYLVANIA

Were it nOt for the Act of 1913, which apparently confers
unlimited jurisdiction upon our courts in divorce proceedings,
against respondents who never were in any way subject to their
jurisdiction, this Act of 1915, would be comparatively harmless, for then our courts undoubtedly would hold, as was held
in Beckett v. Beckett,70 that service by publication is permissible
only where the respondent is, or had at one time been, subject
to the jurisdiction of this State.
The proper remedy for the unfortunate situation at present
existing would be to repeal the Act of May 9, 1913; but such
consummation devoutly to be wished will hardly be attained
save through a determination of the questions involved by our
own Supreme Court, and perhaps the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Win. D. Crocker.
Williamsport, Pa.
" Note 68, .supra.

